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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit reviewed several deci-
sions handed down by administrative agencies, following the pattern of
recent years.' This article will discuss seven of the most important of
these cases. The Tenth Circuit concentrated its review of the cases in
the following areas: sufficiency of evidence, 2 the duty to follow prece-
dent,3 the parameters ofjudicial restraint,4 and the scope of protection
offered by the fifth amendment in an administrative action. 5 While judi-
cial deference remained the general rule in reviewing an administrative
decision, it is important to note that the Tenth Circuit reversed the ma-
jority of the cases discussed herein.
I. SUBSTANTIALITY OF EVIDENCE
A. Background
It is a general rule in administrative law that a "reviewing court shall
... hold unlawful and set aside agency action findings .. .and conclu-
sions found to be... unsupported by substantial evidence .... ,,6 While
this empowers a reviewing court to reverse an agency's decision on the
grounds of insubstantial evidence, it leaves to the courts to define ex-
actly where the line between "insubstantial" and "substantial" evidence
is to be drawn. Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a
mere scintilla. 7 It has also been said to be such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.8
Unfortunately, these standards are nothing more than ad hoc defini-
tions. Thus, in order to give them meaning, one must examine a court's
ad hoc reviews of substantial evidence issues.
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit reviewed two cases
concerning the substantiality of evidence. Both cases involved decisions
by the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), and both cases were
1. See Note, Administrative Law, 64 DEN. U.L. REV. 105 (1987); Note, Administrative
Law, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 165 (1986).
2. Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987); Weakley v. Heckler, 795 F.2d
64 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Temple, 793 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1986).
4. United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v. Com-
mercial Office Prods. Co., 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986) revd., 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988);
Rutherford v. United States, 806 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 1732 (1988).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(e) (1980).
7. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
8. Id.
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reversed. 9
B. Talbot v. Heckler'
°
The claimant, Harley Talbot, applied for social security disability
benefits onJune 9, 1982, and again onJune 13, 1983. Each application
was denied by the SSA."l Talbot appealed the second denial to an ad-
ministrative law judge ("ALJ"), who affirmed the SSA's decision. Talbot
then sought review in the Appeals Council of the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("Council"), but was again denied benefits. 12 He
then brought his case to the federal district court, only to have that court
uphold the administrative actions.' 3 Talbot then sought review of his
case by the Tenth Circuit.
1. The ALJ's Decision
Talbot appeared before the ALJ without the benefit of counsel. Af-
ter hearing his testimony and allowing him an opportunity to comment
on the documentary evidence, the ALJ concluded that Talbot was not
disabled as defined by the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled
to benefits. 14
The ALJ based his inquiry on whether or not Talbot was able to
either return to his previous occupation or to engage in other work, as
required by the SSA regulations. 15 The ALJ determined that Talbot
could not return to his past work, which required medium to heavy exer-
tion, because his residual functional capacity ("RFC") would not allow
it. 16 However, the ALJ also found that Talbot did retain the RFC for a
wide range of light work, restricted only "by inability to work in environ-
ments with excessive dust, fumes or gases."'
17
The ALJ's decision recognized no substantial exertional limitations
on Talbot's ability to perform the full range of light work. However, the
ALJ explicitly recognized the environmental restrictions which are con-
sidered non-exertional limitations on the ability to perform work. 18 In
the end, the ALJ concluded that the "claimant's capacity for the wide
range of light work has not been significantly compromised by his non-
exertional limitations."' 19 He further concluded that, pursuant to Rule
202.14 of the SSA's Medical Vocational Guidelines concerning residual
strength, age, work experience and education, Talbot was not
9. See supra note 2.
10. 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987).
11. Id. at 1457. The impairments are listed in Appendix I of the Social Security Act
regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 1.
12. Talbot, 814 F.2d at 1457.
13. Id.





19. Id. The non-exertional limitations were an "inability to work in environments




2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The primary issue for the Tenth Circuit was whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that Talbot had the exer-
tional capacity to perform a full range of light work. 2 ' Relying on an
analysis of the entire record of the case, the court determined that many
of the conclusions upon which the ALJ based his decision lacked sub-
stantial evidence.
The ALJ had concluded that the claimant's testimony was "not
wholly credible and ... somewhat probably exaggerated."' 22 The court
found this conclusion to be unwarranted, noting that the ALJ had failed
to give any particular reasons for drawing this conclusion.23 The ALJ
had also made the inference that the claimant had himself showed that
he thought he was capable of returning to work by seeking retraining.
2 4
The ALJ used this inference as support for his ultimate finding that Tal-
bot's respiratory impairments imposed only "an insignificant environ-
mental restriction" on his ability to work. 25 The court found the logic of
this conclusion inconsistent, and again ruled there was a lack of substan-
tial evidence.
2 6
The ALJ had further concluded that Talbot's combined impair-
ments had not prevented him from performing light and sedentary work
"on a regular and continued basis," and used this conclusion to support
his finding of insignificant environmental conditions. 27 The court found
this conclusion to be in defiance of the record, noting that the uncontra-
dicted information in the record suggested a contrary conclusion, and
was not even addressed by the ALJ.
28
Lastly, the ALJ had concluded that, despite a conflicting series of
medical reports on Talbot by various doctors, Talbot was capable of en-
gaging in a full range of light work.29 The court noted that the ALJ had
failed to properly evaluate and explain the conflicting reports of the
physicians, and thus based his decision on impressions and mis-
20. Id. n.l. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, § 202.00, Table No. 2, Rule 202.14
(where one's age, education, and previous work experience are factors considered in mak-
ing a decision).
21. 814 F.2d at 1461.
22. Id. at 1459.
23. Id. at 1461.
24. Id. Talbot had applied for rehabilitation training-training which was denied be-
cause of his impairments, using different criteria for disability than the SSA criteria.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1461-62. "Light" and "sedentary" work are defined in C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(a) & (b) (1986). The ALJ determined that Talbot's attempt to do some paint-
ing and install a shower was a performance of light and sedentary work on a regular basis.
The ALJ failed to consider that Talbot was unable to finish or keep these jobs because of
health problems, and was never paid for them.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1463.
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characterizations. 30 Because of the insubstantial evidence which formed
the basis for many of the ALJ's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit reversed
the decision, and awarded benefits to Talbot commencing from the date
of his second application.
3 '
C. Weakley v. Heckler
In Weakley v. Heckler,32 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the
second of the "SSA" cases involving the issue of "substantiality of evi-
dence." George Weakley had appealed the denial of his disability insur-
ance benefits which he had applied for after suffering a back injury at
work.3 3 The ALJ who conducted the hearing found that Weakley's back
impairment met listing 1.05(c) of the Social Security Listing of Impair-
ments. 34 However, the ALJ found that Weakley was not entitled to ben-
efits because he failed to give an acceptable reason for refusing to have
the back surgery his physician had prescribed.
3 5
The Council denied Weakley's subsequent appeal, forcing Weakley
to seek review in federal district court. That court rejected Weakley's
claim for benefits, in an opinion which failed to consider the fact that
Weakley's back impairment had been found to meet listing 105(c) of the
Social Security Listing of Impairments.
3 6
1. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Once again, the primary issue on appeal was whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the administrative decision, as required by
42 U.S.C. section 405(g).3 7 In this case, the decision was made by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny Weakley his benefits
because he refused to submit to prescribed surgery.
38
The court found that Weakley had met his burden of demonstrating
impairment, noting that the Secretary did not dispute that the back in-
jury met listing 105(C). 3 9 However, the court held that the Secretary had
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating why Weakley's refusal to sub-
mit to prescribed surgery was unjustified.40 Because the Secretary did
not present substantial evidence that the rejected back surgery was ex-
pected to restore Weakley's ability to work, the first element of the four-
30. Id. at 1464.
31. Id. at 1466. The court decided that it was only at this time that the record con-
tained substantial evidence of Talbot's disability.
32. 795 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1986).
33. Id. at 65.
34. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R., pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 1. listing 1.05(c)).
35. Id.
36. Id. Apparently, the district court acted as merely a rubber stamp in affirming the
ALJ's decision. However, it is not entirely clear upon what exactly the district court based
its decision.
37. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 4 0 5(g) (Supp. 1985), "The findings of the Secretary . . . if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ......
38. 795 F.2d at 65. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530 (1987).
39. Weakley, 795 F.2d at 65.
40. Id. at 66. The applicable test is as follows: Once the claimant demonstrates that
[Vol. 65:4
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prong test was not satisfied, and the denial of benefits was in error.4 '
D. Analysis
An analysis of the Talbot and Weakley decisions must be conducted
within the framework of 42 U.S.C. section 40 5 (g), which provides that
federal review of an agency's factual findings must be limited to the
question of whether substantial evidence supports the factual finding.
4 2
The analysis must also consider the review standards discussed above.
Of the two cases, the Talbot case is the more expansive. The Talbot
court specifically adopted the Supreme Court's holding that substantial
evidence must be "more than a mere scintilla" and of "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' 4 3 However, the Talbot court also stated that the search for
adequate evidence does not include a weighing of the evidence, and a
court must refrain from substituting its discretion for that of the
agency.44 Still, the Talbot court felt that the reviewing court must con-
sider the record as a whole, and the "substantiality of the evidence must
take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its
weight."
45
With these basic parameters providing the backdrop, the Talbot and
Weakley decisions appear to be soundly reached. As stated above, the
Talbot court found the reasoning behind the ALJ's major conclusions to
be less than persuasive. The ALJ's conclusion as to the claimant's credi-
bility was rejected, not because it was beyond his authority to make such
a judgment, but because he failed to provide any particular reasoning
for discounting Talbot's credibility except to observe that there were no
witnesses present when Talbot suffered his alleged blackouts.
4 6
Concerning the ALJ's second conclusion that Talbot himself be-
lieved he could return to work by trying to retrain himself,4 7 the court
again did not question the authority of the ALJ to make such an infer-
ence. However, the court refused to allow the use of the inference to
he is impaired, the government has the burden of demonstrating each of the four ele-
ments:
I. The treatment at issue should be expected to restore the claimant's ability to
work;
2. The treatment must have been prescribed;
3. The treatment must have been refused;
4. The refusal must have been without justifiable excuse. See Teter v. Heckler, 775
F.2d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 1985). See also Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 950, 953 (1 1th Cir.
1983); Cassiday v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1981).
41. 795 F.2d at 66.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. 1985).
43. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NRLB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
44. Talbot, 814 F.2d at 1461.
45. Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)). Similarly,
the Weakley court felt that its role was to consider the record as a whole, and determine
whether that record contained substantial evidence to support the administrative decision.
46. Id. at 1461. Talbot had experienced blackouts and dizzy spells over a period of
several years prior to his application for benefits.
47. Id.
19881
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conclude that Talbot thought he could work at a full range of activity
rather than a limited range of light or sedentary activity.4 8 This particu-
lar substantial evidence issue provides a useful illustration of how far an
agency's evidentiary finding may go in terms of supporting differing
conclusions. The court was willing to allow the fact that Talbot at-
tempted to retrain himself as sufficient to sustain the conclusion that he
thought he could work.4 9 But the court refused to allow that factual
finding to sustain the further conclusion that Talbot thought he could
work at a certain activity level. 50 To determine the activity level, more
evidence was needed.
Lastly, the court addressed the ALJ's finding of insignificant envi-
ronmental restrictions, 51 which the ALJ attempted to support with the
conclusion that Talbot had been able to perform light and sedentary
work on a "regular and continued basis."' 5 2 The court examined this
conclusion by comparing the evidentiary record with the requirements
of the social security definitions, and found the ALJ's conclusion to be
"highly questionable. ' 5 3 The information in the record suggested that
Talbot did not meet the definitional requirements. However, the court
did not reverse the ALJ for making a conclusion in defiance of the rec-
ord, but did so because the ALJ failed to even address the contradictory
information that was contained in the record.
54
The Weakley decision is more straightforward. The court focused on
a single issue: whether the Secretary had met his burden of showing
that the rejected back surgery was expected to restore Weakley's ability
to work. 5 5 The Secretary presented the testimony of one doctor who
stated that Weakley's problem was correctable by surgery, and that fol-
lowing the surgery, Weakley would have an estimated residual disability
of 15% to the body as a whole. 56 This testimony was in contradiction to
several doctors' testimony on behalf of Weakley that there was a good
possibility that there would be no improvement with the surgery. 57
The court found the ALJ's decision lacked the requisite substantial
evidence. The court could not see how one doctor's statement, which
itself admitted that a significant residual disability would remain, could
somehow outweigh the contrary opinions of several other doctors. 58
Again, the court did not quarrel with the decision. It suggested that the








55. Weakley, 795 F.2d at 66.
56. Id. The physician based his estimate on the probable results of the surgery and





not, 59 but it refused to "rubber-stamp" a decision based on insubstan-
tial evidence.
E. Conclusion
The conclusion to be drawn from the Talbot and Weakley decisions is
that judicial deference to agency decisions ends when unsubstantiated
conclusions are drawn by administrative judges and panels. From Tal-
bot, one may assume that credibility judgments made by an ALJ must be
based on more than mere impression or any other single subjective fac-
tor. One may also conclude that some factual findings may be sufficient
to establish general inferences. 60 From both Talbot and Weakley, one
may assume that conclusions which are drawn in defiance of the record
will be reversed. Beyond their illustrative examples, neither Talbot nor
Weakley provides a definite standard as to what constitutes "substantial
evidence." Instead, the standard has been, and is likely to long remain,
what a court believes would persuade a reasonable mind.
II. THE AGENCY'S DUTY TO FOLLOW ITS OWN PRECEDENT
A. Background
In Midwestern Transportation, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,6
1
the Tenth Circuit held that a court "must require the agency to adhere
to its own pronouncements or explain its departure from them; an
agency must apply criteria it has announced as controlling or otherwise
satisfactorily explain the basis for its departure therefrom." '6 2 This
holding was in line with the Tenth Circuit's earlier holdings as well as
previous United States Supreme Court rulings. 6 3 During the survey pe-
riod, the Tenth Circuit was again faced with reviewing an agency deci-
sion which departed from its own precedent.
B. Big Horn Coal Company v. Temple64
In Big Horn, the Tenth Circuit was petitioned to review the final or-
der of a Department of Labor Benefits Review Board (the "Board")
which had upheld a previous ruling by an ALJ. The ALJ had awarded
disability benefits to Edward Temple, an employee of Big Horn, under
the Black Lung Benefits Act (the "Act"). 65 Because the ALJ had failed
59. In doing so, the court limited itself to the record. Since the Secretary had agreed
that Weakley was in fact disabled, the court had no choice but to limit its review to the
question of whether Weakley's refusal was reasonable. The court thus affirmed that review
of an agency decision is confined to the record.
60. For example, Talbot's retraining attempts could sustain a conclusion as to his
state of mind, but this same factual finding may be insufficient to sustain a legal conlcusion
that Talbot could work at a definite level of activity.
61. 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 777.
63. Squaw Transit Co. v. United States, 574 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Atchi-
son, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973).
64. 793 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1986).
65. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1986) (providing in part that "the purpose of this sub-
1988]
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to consider evidence which the Board, in previous cases, had deemed
necessary to a decision, 66 the Tenth Circuit reversed the Board's order
and remanded for further proceedings.
1. The ALJ's Decision
Temple had originally filed his claim for benefits under the Act in
1976.67 In 1977, the claim was informally denied on the basis that
neither the x-ray report nor the ventilatory study showed pneumoconio-
sis under the applicable regulations. 68 In 1978 the Act was amended69
and Temple's original application was reviewed. The informal denial
was reversed, and Temple was ruled eligible for benefits under the
Act. 70 Big Horn generally denied Temple's claim and requested a hear-
ing in front of an ALJ.
After the hearing, the ALJ issued a Decision and Order which found
that Temple had pneumoconiosis under the interim presumption found
in 20 C.F.R. section 727.203(a)(3). This section essentially provides that
if a coal miner has been employed as such for at least ten years, he will
be presumed to have work-related pneumoconiosis if the blood gas
studies reveal an impairment in the transfer of oxygen from the lungs to
the blood when the values equal or exceed those in the appropriate ta-
ble. 7 1 The ALJ specifically found that the applicable criteria necessary
to invoke the presumption was satisfied.
72
Upon finding the "interim presumption" triggered, the ALJ then
turned to the question of whether Big Horn had rebutted the presump-
tion under C.F.R. section 727.203(b). The ALJ ruled that Big Horn
failed to rebut the presumption under the enumerated methods in that
section. 73 The ALJ stated that there was no medical evidence which
chapter is to provide benefits.., to coal miners who are totally disabled due to pneumo-
coniosis and to the surviving dependents of miners whose death was due to such disease
66. See Martino v. U.S. Fuel Co., 6 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-33 (1983).
67. Big Horn Coal Co., 793 F.2d at 1166.
68. Id.
69. Among the 1978 amendments to the Act was § 902(0, which broadened the term
"total disability" in an attempt to liberalize the award of benefits. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)
(1978).
70. Id.
71. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a)(3) provides:
(a) Establishing interim presumption. A miner who engaged in coal mine employ-
ment for at least 10 years will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumo-
coniosis .. . if one of the following requirements is met: ...
(3) Blood gas studies which demonstrate the presence of an impairment in
the transfer of oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood as indicated
by values which are equal to or less than the values specified in the
following table ....
The ALJ specifically found that the values necessary to invoke this presumption were pres-
ent. Id. at 1167.
72. The specific values which triggered the presumption were "a P.C02 of 31 and
P.02 of 57 at rest and a P.C02 of 32 and P.02 of 67 upon exercise." Id.
73. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) provides:
(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption. In adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all
relevant medical evidence shall be considered. The presumption in paragraph [20
C.F.R. § 727 .203(a)] shall be rebutted if: .. (1) in light of all relevant evidence it
[Vol. 65:4
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would permit a finding that Temple did not have "any chronic pulmo-
nary disease ... aggravated ... by coal mine employment." 74 This rul-
ing was subsequently approved by the Board. Big Horn objected to this
ruling, and raised on appeal the issue of whether the Board had erred in
approving the ALJ's evaluation of the arterial blood gas tests without
considering the effects of altitude and weight.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit focused its review on the rebuttal evidence of-
fered by Big Horn. Specifically, the evidence consisted of testimony by
Dr. Hoyer, a physician who reviewed and commented on Temple's 1979
Arterial Blood Gas ("ABG") test results. Dr. Hoyer testified that the
tests used on Temple "did not establish a pulmonary abnormality in
light of the post-exercise results, the age of the miner, and the altitude at
which the test was performed."' 75 The ALJ ignored this conflicting evi-
dence, and his actions were affirmed by the Director of the Office of
Worker's Compensation Programs, Department of Labor.
On appeal, the Director conceded that it was error for the ALJ to
have not considered the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Hoyer, but claimed
that the omission was harmless error. 76 Big Horn, however, claimed
that the omission was reversible error, and relied upon the Board's own
decision in Martino v. United States Fuel Company.
77
In Martino, the Board rejected a challenge to the validity of C.R.S.
section 727.203(a)(3) interim presumption because the table standards
were not adjusted for altitude. 78 However, the Board also explained
that the AL must consider rebuttal evidence regarding the effect of alti-
tude and other factors on the AGB test results. 79 The Board ruled that
"if a blood gas study produces abnormal results which can be attributed
to altitude rather than pathogenic dysfunction, then this evidence ... is
relevant medical evidence which the fact finder must consider if intro-
duced ...."80
Because the Director had acknowledged that the ALJ had failed to
consider the kind of evidence which Martino deemed necessary to a deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit found little difficulty in reversing the Agency's
decision. Since no explanation was offered for the divergence from Mar-
tino, the Tenth Circuit held that the failure to consider the rebuttal evi-
dence was reversible error.8 '
is established that the individual is in fact doing his usual coal mine work or com-
parable or gainful work ....
Emphasis added.
74. Big Horn Coal Co., 793 F.2d at 1167 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 727.202).
75. Id. at 1168.
76. Id.
77. 6 BLACK LUNG REP. 1-33 (1983).
78. Big Horn Coal Co., 793 F.2d at 1168.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1169.
1988]
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3. Conclusion
It is important to note the uncompromising posture which the court
assumes in Big Horn. Although the equities, and certainly the sympa-
thies, of the case point toward an award of benefits to a black lung vic-
tim, the court intransigeantly clings to the time-honored rule that an
agency shall be bound by its own precedent unless adequate explanation
exists for a departure from it. 82 The court, by remanding, is forcing the
agency to go through the proper hoops, even if doing so prevents an
individual suffering a compensable occupational disease from recover-
ing compensation. The law in this area appears to be etched in stone:
An agency will not be allowed to deviate from its own precedent, absent
an explanation for doing so.
III. THE AGENCY'S INTERPRETATION OF PROMULGATED RULES AND
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
A. Background
The standard for federal review of agency decisions is set forth in 5
U.S.C. section 706.83 Although this section provides broad grounds for
such review, historically courts have shown a reluctance to overturn an
agency decision. Among the first cases espousing the need for judicial
restraint in reviewing agency decisions was Ford Motor Credit Company v.
Milhollin.84 There it was held that an agency's construction of its own
regulation is entitled to substantial deference from the judiciary. 8 5 The
Tenth Circuit expanded this rule in Emery Mining Corp. v. Secretary of La-
bor,86 stating that judicial deference is especially appropriate if agency
expertise or technical knowledge is involved, or if the agency's construc-
tion is contemporaneous with the regulation's promulgation.
8 7
Three times during the survey period, the Tenth Circuit was con-
fronted with the difficult issue of whether to replace an agency's inter-
pretation of a regulation with that of its own.8 8 In two of the cases, the
82. National Conservative Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Midwestern Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1980). "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... unsupported by substantial
evidence .... "
84. 444 U.S. 555 (1980). A group of car buyers whose retail purchase contracts were
assigned to a finance company, filed suit against the finance company for violations of the
Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § § 1601-1700) and Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve
Board (12 C.F.R. part 226). The alleged violations centered on undisclosed acceleration
clauses. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of a clear expression by either the
Act or Regulation Z, a high degree of deference must be shown to the Reserve Board and
its staff.
85. Id. at 556.
86. 744 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1984) (dealing with the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission's finding that a mine operator had violated the miner retraining re-
quirements of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act). The court of appeals held that
agency's interpretation of its enabling statute and its own regulations is entitled to
deference.
87. Id. at 1415.
88. United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986); E.E.O.C. v. Com-
[Vol. 65:4
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court overruled the agency interpretation. However, in each of the two,
a vigorous dissent was filed on the issue of whether to defer to agency
interpretation and expertise. In the third case, the agency interpretation
was upheld by a unanimous panel.
B. United Transportation Union v. Dole
89
1. Background
The Federal Railway Administration ("FRA") and the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation ("Secretary") are charged with en-
forcing the railroad safety laws by the Hours of Service Act (the
"Act").9 0 Among other things, the Act seeks to improve the safety of
sleeping accommodations which railroads provide for their crews, spe-
cifically prohibiting the housing of crews in a dorm if the buildings are in
the immediate vicinity (within 1/2 mile) of railroad tracks where hazard-
ous materials are switched. 9 1 However, the Act also establishes a grand-
father clause, whereby buildings which were in existence before July 8,
1976, are exempt from the location requirements unless construction or
reconstruction is performed on the building.9 2 The term "construc-
tion" is defined by the Act and its implementing regulations to include
acquisition and use of an existing building.
93
In United Transportation Union, the FRA was charged with failure to
fulfill its mandatory enforcement obligations against the St. Louis
Southwestern Railroad Company ("SSW"). The specific charge was that
the FRA failed to issue orders prohibiting SSW from housing its em-
ployees in a dormitory located in the Armourdale yard in Kansas City,
Kansas.
94
The Armourdale dormitory had been constructed by the Chicago,
Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company in 1966. In March of 1980,
SSW purchased the dormitory along with some trackage and the sur-
rounding railyard. The dormitory was built within 300 feet of tracks
where switching operations for hazardous materials took place. During
mercial Office Prods. Co., 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988);
Rutherford v. United States, 806 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1986).
89. 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986).
90. 45 U.S.C. § 64(b) (1986) (which states in part, "lilt shall be the duty of the Secre-
tary of Transportation to lodge with the appropriate United States Attorney information
of any violation as may come to the knowledge of the Secretary"); 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(d)
(1985) (the Federal Railroad Administration is delegated authority to: "(a) investigate and
report on safety compliance records of applicants seeking railroad operating
authority .. ")
91. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 825.
92. Id. at 826.
93. See 49 C.F.R. § 228.101(c) (1985) which provides:
(c) As used in this subpart-
(1) "Construction" shall refer to the-
(i) Creation of a new facility;
(ii) Expansion of an existing facility;
(iii) Placement of a mobile or modular facility;
(iv) Acquisition and use of an existing building.
Emphasis added.
94. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 825.
1988]
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the period between May 1980 and July 1983, the dormitory was used as
a locker facility in lieu of a sleeping facility. At the end of this period,
however, the SSW announced plans to refurbish the structure and re-
sume use of it as a sleeping facility. Thus, there arose the situation
where a grandfathered facility was transferred from one railroad to
another.
For its defense, the FRA asserted that, according to its own inter-
pretation of its regulations, the transfer in question did not fall within
the definition of "construction," and was therefore exempt from the lo-
cation requirements of the Act.95 Specifically, the FRA claimed that the
regulation which provides that "construction refers to acquisition and
use of an existing building" did not include within its purview those
buildings which were sold from one railroad to another, as in the pres-
ent case.
96
The trial court granted FRA's motion for summary judgment on
this ground, holding that the rulemakers were not concerned with the
transfer of grandfathered facilities from one railroad to another.97 It
further held that "SSW's plan for rehabilitation of the dormitory facility
does not meet the definition of construction... [contained in] 49 C.F.R.
section 228.101 (c) (1). '98 However, the trial court failed to explain why
this definition was not met 99 and United Transportation Union
("UTU") appealed, challenging the FRA's interpretation of its own
regulations.1 00
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
After a preliminary determination of waiver,' 0 ' the court focused
on the FRA's interpretation of 49 C.F.R. section 228.101(c). 10 2 FRA
maintained that the regulation did not include existing buildings which
are transferred from one railroad to another.' 0 3 UTU urged that all ac-
quisitions are subject to the prohibition on construction.1
0 4
In a split decision, in which each of the three participating judges
wrote an opinion, the court ruled that the agency's interpretation was
inconsistent with congressional intent, the plain language of the regula-
tion, and its own prior administrative interpretations. 10 5 Although the
court acknowledged the general rule that substantial deference must be
95. Id. at 828.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 827.
98. Id.
99. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 826-27.
100. Id.
101. The issue of waiver before the court was whether UTU had abandoned the issue
because of its failure to adequately develop the issue in its brief. The court held that
because the issue was at least superficially discussed in UTU's brief, was adequately dis-
cussed in FRA's brief, and was an issue of importance and first impression, the issue was
not now waived. Id. at 827.
102. Id. at 828.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 829.
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shown to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation,10 6 it refused
to allow that deference to become "blind adherence."' 1 7 Because the
issue was one involving a question of statutory interpretation, a question
of law, the court ruled that it was the final authority. 108 Under that au-
thority, the court reversed the lower rulings, and found SSW's proposed
reopening of the Armourdale facility to be within the definition of "con-
struction" as contemplated by 49 C.F.R. section 228.101(c).10 9
Interestingly, the dissent used the same analytical framework as the
majority to reach a completely opposite result. In examining the statute
and its legislative history, the dissent found nothing which would sug-
gest that existing facilities should lose their statutory exemption and be-
come "new construction" if the ownership of a railroad passed from one
railroad to another.' 10 It directed the court's attention to the fact that
in the face of an economic climate which was conducive to mergers and
acquisitions, Congress nowhere provided a caveat that transfer of own-
ership would trigger the prohibition.I I 1 Thus, Congress' primary intent
was to prevent the abrupt loss of railroad capital assets through an artifi-
cial external event, such as legislation or changes in the ownership of
railroads.' 12
In examining the regulations, the dissent pleaded for judicial re-
straint, maintaining that if there was any ambiguity in such a case, a
court is compelled to defer to an agency's interpretation, especially
when that agency interprets its own regulation.' 1 When there is such
ambiguity, "the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."' 14 In opposition to the majority, the
dissent found no such error.
In response to the dissent, a concurring opinion was filed. It dis-
agreed with the dissent's interpretation of the congressional intent be-
hind the statute. The concurrence felt that the intent was for employee
safety, not railroad economics. 1 15 The grandfather clause was added to
ameliorate the loss incurred by the railroads, but not to eliminate their
obligation to provide safe housing.' 16
The concurrence also took the position that judicial responsibility
demands review of agency interpretation when an agency overindulges
106. Id.
107. Id. See also Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987) (where the court
also discusses the limits of judicial deference in area of sufficiency of evidence).
108. United Tramp., 797 F.2d at 829. See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1943).
109. Id. at 829-30.
110. Id. at 834 (dissenting opinion).
111. Id.
112. Id.
i13. Id. at 835 (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965)). See also Hoover &
Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1489 (10th Cir.
1983).
114. United Traosp. 797 F.2d at 835.
115. Id. at 832 (concurring opinion).
116. Id.
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in "ad hoc" decision making or "after the fact rationalizations."''117 It
found dispositive the fact that the FRA itself had stated that the "acquisi-
tion of an existing structure for use as sleeping quarters is listed as an
event clearly within the purview of the statute and these regulations, and
found nothing in the record to suggest that the agency had previously
taken the position it was advocating before the court."' 18 In light of
these facts, the concurrence saw the purpose of the statute and its imple-
menting regulations as the prevention of railroads from making signifi-
cant additional investments in sleeping quarters near hazardous railroad
switching operations after July, 1976.1 19
3. Analysis
The decision in United Transportation appears to be soundly reached.
The majority opinion found that the interpretation being urged by the
FRA was inconsistent with the version set forth when the regulation was
promulgated. °2 0 The majority also found that the agency's interpreta-
tion was inconsistent with the statute it was designed to implement.' 2'
Finally, the majority found that the plain language of the regulation was
inapposite to the agency's interpretation. 122 What emerges from this
analysis is the groundwork for a tripartite test for judicial review of an
agency's interpretations of regulations.
12 3
But the foundation which the majority lays for such review is under-
mined by the dissent's plea for judicial restraint. Fortunately, the dis-
sent's reasons for deferring to the agency interpretation are not as well
reasoned as the majority's. The dissent felt that an examination of the
legislative history revealed an element of ambiguity in the underlying
congressional intent.124 Such ambiguity would compel the court to de-
fer to the expertise of the agency and accept its interpretation. 12 5 The
dissent was in favor of judicial restraint in this case, citing that the
agency's interpretation was not plainly inconsistent with an ambiguous,
general regulation. 1
2 6
While sound in concept, the dissent fails to reconcile its principles
with the facts of the case. As the majority points out, the case does not
involve an area of expertise peculiar to the FRA. 12 7 It is a case of statu-
tory interpretation, a task for which the court is unquestionably quali-
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 832.
120. Id. at 829.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The test, although not specifically designated as such by the court, would be as
follows: An agency's interpretation of its rules will not be shielded from judicial review
when its interpretation is inconsistent with: (I) congressional intent; (2) the plain lan-
guage of the regulation; and (3) its own prior administrative interpretations.
124. Id. at 836.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 829. The court declines to explain what such specialized knowledge would
be. However, based on its later decision in Rutherford v. United States (806 F.2d 1455
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fled. Secondly, the dissent's assertion that the intent behind the Act was
to "prevent the abrupt loss of railroad capital assets" strains credibility.
While this was certainly a pragmatic, conciliatory measure taken by Con-
gress in promulgating the Act, there is little doubt that Congress was
more concerned with worker safety than railroad economics.
12 8
The dissent's analysis of the implementing regulation does appear
more persuasive than its interpretation of the Act's intent. The regula-
tion states that the word "construction" includes "acquisition and use of
an existing building."' 129  The dissent reasoned that since the
rulemakers did not explicitly address the issue of whether railroads are
prohibited from acquiring or using "grandfathered" sleeping quarters,
the court should refrain from imposing its own interpretation. 130 This
analysis is hardly compelling. While it is true that such a situation was
not specifically addressed, it seems more logical to assume that the over-
all intent of Congress, that is, that railroads should make no additional
investment in hazardous sleeping quarters after 1976, eliminates the
ambiguity. To pretend that there is too much ambiguity not to defer,
seems to go beyond judicial deference and into the realm of blind
adherence.
C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial
Office Products Co. 131
1. Background
On March 26, 1984, Suanne Leerssen filed a charge with the EEOC
after being discharged by Commercial Office Products Co. ("Commer-
cial"), alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
13 2
On March 30, the EEOC forwarded a copy of the charge, along with a
charge transmittal form, to the Colorado Civil Rights Division
("CCRD") which stated that the EEOC would initially process the
charge pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between it and the
CCRD.'3 The CCRD returned the charge transmittal form to the
EEOC, indicating that the CCRD waived its right to initially process the
charge. On April 4, 1984, the CCRD sent a letter to Leerssen explaining
that it had waived its right to initially process the charge, but stated that
it specifically retained jurisdiction over her case.
134
The EEOC's investigation began on March 26, 1984, the date that it
(10th Cir. 1986)), such specialized knowledge would involve technical expertise which the
court does not possess.
128. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 825. See also Atchison, T.& S.F.Ry. Co. v. United States,
244 U.S. 336 (1917); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 197 (1918).
129. United Transp., 797 F.2d at 835.
130. Id.
131. 803 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1986), rev d, 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 00e (1985). Section 2000e-2 forbids discrimination in employment
opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Section 2000e-5 out-
lines the procedure for invoking the Act's protections.
133. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 584.
134. Id.
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initially received the complaint.' 3 5 After Commercial refused to cooper-
ate in providing relevant information, the EEOC issued an administra-
tive subpoena.13 6 Commercial refused to comply with the subpoena on
the grounds that Leerssen's charge was untimely filed.' 3 7 The EEOC
sought enforcement of the subpoena at the district court level, but was
denied enforcement on the grounds that the filing of the Title VII
charge was not timely.
138
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the issue of
whether Leerssen's complaint was timely filed under the 300-day filing
requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 139 The court's first
consideration was whether the state agency had been given its sixty days
to act upon the charge. 140 The court looked to the Supreme Court's
decision in Love v. Pullman,14 ' and interpreted it to mean that when a
complainant files a charge with the EEOC, the deferral of that charge by
the EEOC is an initial filing in the state agency sufficient to commence
the 300-day time limitation. 14 2 The court found that the EEOC had ini-
tiated the charge with the CCRD on behalf of Leerssen, and that the
300-day limitation was invoked.1
43
The court then turned to the question of the meaning of the word
"filed" as contemplated by section 706(e).' 4 4 The court found that the
referral of a charge from the EEOC to the state agency begins a period
of "suspended animation" during which the state has a maximum of 60
days to resolve the charge before it can be filed officially with the
135. Id.
136. Id. The commission issued its subpoena pursuant to the power granted by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(2) (1985).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The statutory scheme adopted in § 706 of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1985) makes a distinction between states which have an approved state civil rights en-
forcement agency (deferral states), and those states which do not (non-deferral states),
providing different time limitations for each. In non-deferral states, a charge must be filed
within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice began. An exception to
this 180 day time limit applies in deferral states which effectively grant a 300 day filing
limit for claimant in those states. However, this limit is also subject to the requirement
that no such charge may be filed with the EEOC until the state agency has had 60 days to
file the charge.
140. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 585.
141. 404 U.S. 522 (1972). The court dealt with the complaint of a black porter who
filed a complaint to the EEOC. The EEOC orally notified the Colorado Civil Rights Com-
mission ("CCRC") of its receipt of the complaint. The CCRC waived its right to action,
and the EEOC commenced its own action. The defendant refused to comply on the
grounds that the EEOC had failed to properly notify the CCRC of the complaint, and had
thus failed to follow proper filing procedure. The district court granted summary judg-
ment and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
'oral filing," by the EEOC had been in full compliance with intent of the act, and the time
limits had therefore been properly adhered to.
142. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 586.
143. Id.
144. See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5 (1985).
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EEOC. 14 5 The court found this despite the contrary language of an
EEOC Procedural Regulation, holding along with Love, that Congress
chose to prohibit the filing of any federal charge until after state pro-
ceedings had been completed, or until 60 days had passed.
146
The court agreed with the Supreme Court's Mohasko 147 rationale,
that the combination of a 300-day filing requirement and a 60-day defer-
ral period means that a complainant must file his charge within 240 days
of the alleged discriminatory practice in order to preserve his federal
rights.' 4 8 It also means that any charges brought between the 240th
and 300th day are timely filed with EEOC only if the state agency hap-
pens to complete its proceedings before the expiration of the 60-day
deferral period, and prior to the 300th day. 14 9
The court found that since the 60-day deferral period did not begin
until the 289th day after the alleged unlawful practice, it did not end
until the 349th day, well beyond the 300-day limit.150 Thus, the court
reasoned, the charge could only have been timely filed with the EEOC if
the CCRD had terminated its proceedings under section 706(c) before
expiration of the 300-day limit. '51
The EEOC had argued that a state agency "terminates" its proceed-
ings under section 706(c) when that agency waives its right to initially
process a charge, defers to the EEOC, and retains jurisdiction to act
after the EEOC has completed its proceedings.' 52 This interpretation
was categorically refuted by the Tenth Circuit.
The court chose to adopt the plain and ordinary meaning of the
word "terminate" which, in the context of section 706(c), contemplates
the moment when the agency completely surrenders its jurisdiction over
a complaint.' 53 It likewise interpreted the term "proceedings" to mean
those actions a state agency must take in resolving a charge under Title
VII.1 54 The court was thus faced with deciding whether the forwarding
by the EEOC of the charge to the CCRD, and the CCRD's subsequent
waiver to "initially process" the charge, was a commencement and ter-
mination of state proceedings sufficient to shorten the mandatory 60-
145. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 586.
146. Id.
147. Mohasko Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). The Court decided the question of
whether a letter from a discharged employee sent to the EEOC 291 days after alleged
discriminatory discharge was "filed" for purposes of ritle 7. The Supreme Court held
that the statute prohibited the EEOC from allowing the charge to be filed on the date it
was received. The Court further held that even if the EEOC were allowed to file the com-
plaint automatically for the employee, it would still be required to wait 60 days or until the
state had terminated its proceedings. The state did not terminate its proceedings. There-
fore the 60-day period was invoked and added to the 291 days elapsed after discharge,
putting complainant well above the 300 day limit.
148. Id. at 821.
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day limit. 1 55 The court was convinced that it was not.
The court found that CCRD merely acknowledged receipt of Leer-
ssen's charge, waived initial processing, and retained jurisdiction reserv-
ing the right to act or to adopt the EEOC findings after the EEOC had
terminated its proceedings.156 The court refused to construe this as a
commencement and termination of proceedings.1 5 7 Once this was de-
cided, simple mathematics eliminated Leerssen's complaint. The defer-
ral period required by section 706(c) had not concluded until the 349th
day, and the CCRD had not terminated its proceedings by the 300th
day.1 5 8 The charge was thus ruled not timely filed.
The dissent first contested the majority's interpretation of the legis-
lative history behind Title VII and its implementing legislation. 159 At
the heart of this argument was the idea that Congress did not intend the
burden of a statutory ambiguity to fall on the victims of discrimina-
tion. 160 The ambiguity concerning who is to file when, and to what
agency, was admitted even by the majority.
16 1
The dissent then made a plea for judicial restraint, claiming that the
agency had already interpreted the statute, and the court should defer to
that construction, particularly when that statute is ambiguous. 16 2 It
cited the Supreme Court's rationale that when Congress is silent as to a
statutory question, the court's sole inquiry is to determine whether the
agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute.'
63
The dissent maintained that the EEOC's interpretation of the statute
was clearly rational and consistent with the statute's purpose, and was
thus entitled to judicial deference.
164
3. Analysis
The Commercial decision is surprising, in that the majority opinion
admits that the confusion surrounding the filing requirements defeats
two important congressional goals: (1) the ease of filing civil rights
charges by lay complainants, and (2) timely resolution of civil rights
charges. 16 5 However, in the same breath, the court disqualifies itself
from the task of implementing these goals, claiming that it had no choice
but to follow the text of the statute, the legislative history, and the rele-
vant judicial interpretations. 1
6 6
155. Id. at 589.
156. Id. at 590.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 591.
159. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 585.
162. Id. at 591-92 (citing Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th
Cir. 1982).
163. Id. at 592 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
164. Id.




That "choice" turns out to be far less obligatory than the court
would have us believe. The decision of the case turned essentially on
what constitutes the termination of proceedings. 16 7 In Isaac v. Harvard
University, 16 8 the First Circuit adopted the EEOC's interpretation of sec-
tion 706(c), meaning that a state agency terminates its proceedings
when the agency waives its right to initially process a charge, defers to
the EEOC, and retains jurisdiction to act after the EEOC has completed
its proceedings. The Commercial Office Products opinion expressly refutes
this interpretation, claiming it to be contrary to legislative history and
judicial interpretation.
16 9
In reviewing this "contrary legislative history," the majority seems
to have lost sight of the forest because of the trees. While Congress no
doubt intended to encourage state and local agencies to resolve civil
rights disputes, and to prevent premature federal intervention, it is diffi-
cult to see how these intentions would pre-empt the overall purpose of
the statute, which is to provide a means of redress for the victims of
discrimination.
The dissent is on target in this respect: "One would have to attri-
bute either congressional hostility to discrimination claimants or a lack
of congressional concern for the inability of lay people to understand
this complex statute to suggest [Congress] intended such a result."
7 0
For the majority to rule otherwise, shows an almost slavish obsession to
the technicalities of the law, and a troublesome neglect of the equities of
the case.
This strict constructionist approach is also troublesome in the con-
text of the court's other decisions during this survey period. As in United
Transportation Union,17 1 the court again refuses to defer to an agency's
interpretation of its own rules. While this is not surprising, it nonethe-
less illustrates an incipient antagonism between the court and adminis-
trative agencies.
Nowhere is this more clear than in the majority's footnote number
15.172 There, the court recognized that the time limitations for a Title
VII suit in federal court are subject to equitable modification. It even
hinted that Leerssen, should she decide to raise such an argument in her
own action, would prevail. 17 3 However, since it was the EEOC who
167. Id. at 589.
168. 769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985) (where a state agency's waiver of its right to initially
process a faculty member's employment discrimination charge was held to constitute a
"termination" for the purposes of the 60-day deferral provision of Title VII).
169. Commericial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 587.
170. Id. at 592.
171. 797 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1986).
172. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 590-91 ("We recognize that the time limita-
tions for filing a Title VII suit in federal court are not jurisdictional prerequisites for the
court but rather are subject to equitable modification.... The EEOC, however, failed to
argue to the district court that any equitable circumstances existed in this case that would
have justified a departure from the time limitations .. ").
173. Id. ("Leerssen... can raise any equitable arguments that she might have in seeking
to persuade a court to hear her case despite her failure to file a timely charge with the
EEOC.").
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raised the issue, and since the EEOC failed to argue it before the district
court, the court refused to consider it. 1
74
Lastly, the majority opinion throws away an opportunity to clarify a
confusing situation. The split among the circuits 1 75 has led to a confus-
ing state of affairs for both the layman and the lawyer. The Tenth Cir-
cuit admitted this problem in Commercial Office Products, and refused to
act, under the guise of "separation ofjudicial and legislative functions."
Unfortunately, the court's non-action in this case seems less a separation
of powers than an act ofjudicial apathy.
D. Rutherford v. United States
1. Background
In Rutherford v. United States,17 6 the Tenth Circuit was asked to con-
sider an appeal which was the culmination of nearly twelve years of liti-
gation between terminally ill cancer patients and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). 177 The litigation centered around the drug
Laetrile, a substance which had been classified by the FDA in 1971 as a
"new drug" for the purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (the "Act"). Such a classification normally requires the filing of a
new drug application and subsequent FDA approval before the drug
may be administered.1
78
The introduction of such a "new drug" into interstate commerce is
prohibited by the Act unless the FDA has approved a new drug applica-
tion. In order to be exempt from the new drug requirements, the drug
must be generally recognized by qualified experts as safe and effective
when used in the prescribed manner. 179 Normally, this means that the
proponents of a drug must define its effectiveness by articulating what
the drug is supposed to do. 180
174. Id. ("The EEOC ... failed to argue to the district court that any equitable circum-
stances existed in this case that would have justified a departure from the time limitations
... We adhere to the rule that a party may not raise an issue on appeal that it did not raise
before the district court.") Cf. United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 827 (10th
Cir. 1986) (where the court considered issues on equitable grounds despite the parties'
failure to develop the issue in their brief, according to procedure).
175. See Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 592 (and cases cited therein). The cases in
support of the proposition that a state agency's waiver of its right to initially process a
charge may constitute a "termination" for the 60 day deferral provision, are in the major-
ity. See Isaac, 769 F.2d at 827-28; EEOC v. Ocean City Police Dep't, 617 F. Supp. 1133 (D.
Md. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 787 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1986), reh 'g granted, 795 F.2d 368
(4th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S.Ct. 1990
(1988); Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 580 F. Supp. 662 (D.C. 1984). But
see Klausner v. Southern Oil Co., 533 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (waiver of initial
processing did not constitute a termination of state proceedings).
176. 806 F.2d 1455 (10th Cir. 1986).
177. Id. at 1457. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. 1985) outlines the procedure and requires
that samples be submitted with the proper documentation of the veracity of all statements
within 180 days. The application will either be approved, or a hearing on the question of
approvability will be held within 90 days.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1458.
180. Id. at 1458.
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In Rutherford, the plaintiffs claimed that Laetrile alleviates pain and
that pain reduction should be a criterion for effectiveness.18' This ques-
tion had been raised in the earlier decisions, as well as in the FDA hear-
ings. 182 However, the FDA determined that there was no general
recognition of effectiveness for pain alleviation. This determination was
based on both medical studies and physician testimony.
183
On appeal from the FDA's decision, the district court affirmed the
FDA's ruling that Laetrile was not "generally recognized as safe and ef-
fective," thus classifying it as a new drug.' 8 4 However, the district court
further held that Laetrile was exempt from new drug status because of a
1962 grandfather clause.' 8 5 After two reviews by the Tenth Circuit on
the issue of exempt status, and an order to dismiss, the district court
instead allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.' 8 6 In their
amended complaint, the plaintiffs asserted that a new issue had arisen
which would justify reconsideration of their case. The district court
agreed and reopened the case.
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The crucial issue before the Tenth Circuit in Rutherford was whether
the district court had erred in reopening the case and allowing the plain-
tiffs to amend their complaint. The court held in the affirmative.
Although acknowledging that a district court generally has discretion to
allow an amended complaint when the appellate court reverses and re-
mands, such discretion is not unbounded.' 8 7 The court held that if an
appellate court ruling either calls for or precludes amendment, then the
district court has no discretion in allowing an amended complaint. '
8 8
In applying this general principle to the facts in Rutherford, the
Tenth Circuit found that because it had previously affirmed the district
court's ruling regarding laetrile's "lack of effectiveness," the district
court was bound by that decision.' 8 9 The court further held that the




184. Id. at 1459.
185. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 3 2 1(p)(1) (1984) ("[A] drug ... shall not be deemed to be a
"new drug" if at any time prior to this chapter it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of
June 30, 1906 ...."). See also Public Law No. 87-781, § 107(c)(4), 76 sta. 788 ("In the case
of any drug which, on the day immediately preceding the enactment date, (A) was com-
mercially used or sold in the United States, (B) was not a new drug as defined by section
201 (p) of the basic Act as then in force, and (C) was not covered by an effective application
under section 505 of that Act, the amendments to section 201 (p)... shall not apply....").
186. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1459.
187. Id. at 1459-60. See R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 525 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir.
1975). See also Beltran v. Myers, 701 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1134
(1983) (lower courts may decide an issue on remand so long as the issue was not expressed
or impliedly disposed of on appeal).
188. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1460.
189. Id.
190. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff's assertion of a new issue was in fact
merely an assertion of newly discovered evidence.
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appellate mandate, and justify reconsideration at the district court level.
The court held that the district court simply did not have jurisdiction to
hear the new evidence, and that the proper forum for such reconsidera-
tion was with the body that initially decided the issue-the FDA.' 9 '
Thus, the plaintiffs' remedy lay with the FDA and not the district court.
3. Analysis
The Rutherford case presents a new twist in the area of judicial re-
straint in the review of agency decisions. Unlike United Transportation
and Commercial Office Products, the restraint here imposed is jurisdictional,
rather than doctrinal.
The plaintiffs had attempted to introduce a new issue into the case
for the purpose of reopening it. '9 2 They stated the new issue to be "as
of 1984, Laetrile was an ordinary drug not requiring any 'new drug' ap-
proval because [it was] generally recognized as safe and effective to alle-
viate or reduce pain .... ,193 This issue differed only by date, from the
one previously disposed of. 19 4 The Tenth Circuit refused to consider
this a new issue, finding that a simple change of date was not a statement
of a new issue, but rather an indication of newly developed evidence. 195
As such, the initial jurisdiction to hear that evidence lay with the FDA
and not the district court.
The court cited its previous holding in Trujillo v. General Electric
Co., 196 stating that "[a]dministrative agencies have an inherent authority
to reconsider their own decisions, since the power to decide in the first
instance carries with it the power to reconsider."' 19 7 In doing so, the
court established jurisdictional parameters on judicial review of agency
decisions. Normally, the Tenth Circuit has permitted lower courts al-
most plenary power in the decision to review or not to review.19 8 How-
ever, the court was not willing to allow a district court to usurp initial
jurisdiction of an administrative case since hearing evidence is not the
function of a reviewing court, and in the case of administrative hearings,
the district court is a reviewing court.
The Tenth Circuit was very concerned with maintaining the proper
separation of the FDA and the district courts as contemplated by the






196. 621 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1980) (where the court held that district director of the
EEOC had the power to reconsider his earlier determination, and had the power to re-
verse his finding and rescind his earlier notice of right to sue).
197. Id. at 1086.
198. See supra note I.
199. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1461. See 21 U.S.C.S. § 355(h) (1984) (Until the record is
filed for appeal, the Secretary may modify his order concerning a new drug application.
After the record is filed, the petitioner may apply to the court to present additional evi-




ing the intent of Congress to give the FDA primary jurisdiction in deter-
mining evidentiary matters concerning new drugs. 200 It is also apparent
that the court was uneasy with the district court's failure to defer to
agency expertise in a matter which demanded such expertise.
2 0 '
The Rutherford case is an unusual example ofjudicial restraint in the
review of agency decisions. The case history of the Tenth Circuit has
been in favor ofjudicial review. 20 2 However, the court in this instance
could not allow the district court to use its right to review an agency
decision as a way to "supplant the FDA by making a de novo determina-
tion of 'new drug' status after reviewing evidence never considered by
the FDA. '"203 The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that the judicial role in
agency cases is not to conduct evidentiary hearings, but merely to review
the final decisions that result from those hearings.
IV. REGULATORY OR PUNITIVE? THE CHARACTERIZATION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT.
A. Background
The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause 20 4 protects not
only a defendant's right to refuse to take the witness stand at his own
criminal trial, but also the privilege of any witness, in any formal or in-
formal governmental proceeding, to refuse to answer questions when
the answers might incriminate him. 20 5 The witness's privilege against
self-incrimination not only protects the individual against being involun-
tarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution, but
also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the an-
swers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. 20 6 How-
ever, this is a privilege to decline to respond to inquiries, not a
prohibition against inquiries designed to elicit responses incriminating
in nature. 20 7 To rely on this facet of the amendment's protection, a wit-
ness must normally take the stand, be sworn to testify, and assert the
privilege in response to each allegedly incriminating question as it is
asked. 2
0 8
The defendant's right to refuse to take the stand is the right of an
200. 21 U.S.C.§ 355(h) (1985).
201. Cf. United Transp. Union, 797 F.2d at 829.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 672 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1982); Sabin v. Butz, 515
F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975); Bramble v. Kleindienst, 357 F.Supp. 1028 (D.C. Colo. 1973),
aff'd, Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974).
203. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1461.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... ").
205. See, e.g., United States v. Housing Found. of Am., 176 F.2d 665 (3rd Cir. 1949);
United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978).
206. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
207. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 130 at 315 (3d Ed. 1984).
208. United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir. 1974), cerl. denied, 419 U.S.
826 (1974).
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accused at his own criminal trial to avoid not only giving incriminating
responses to inquiries put to him, but to be free from the inquiries
themselves.2 0 9 The defendant may invoke this protection by simply not
offering to testify.2 10 While this protection is absolute in a criminal pro-
ceeding, it does not extend to proceedings which are administrative in
nature. In the case of administrative proceedings, the issue centers
around the characterization of the sanction being contemplated, and
whether that sanction is regulatory or punitive.
The test applied to determine whether a statutorily defined penalty
is civil or criminal has traditionally proceeded on two levels. 2 11 The first
level is to determine the intent of Congress in establishing the penalty.
Second, where Congress has indicated an intent to establish a civil pen-
alty, is to determine whether the statutory scheme was so punitive in
either purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
2 12
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit was asked to consider a
case where the defendant in an administrative hearing sought protection
under the fifth amendment's witness and defendant clauses. 2 13 The
court granted the review, and held that neither protection was available.
B. Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board
1. Facts
In Roach v. National Transportation Safety Board,2 14 Joseph A. Roach
petitioned for review of a final order of the NTSB which suspended
Roach's commercial pilot's certificate for thirty days.2 15 The suspension
was the result of flight violations made by Roach at the La Junta, Colo-
rado, airport. After conducting a sales demonstration flight, Roach took
off with a Roach Aircraft Sales Representative, for a return flight to Den-
ver. Before returning to Denver, however, Roach made three passes
over the LaJunta airport runway at an altitude of approximately 500 feet
so that his clients could see the plane in flight. At the end of the third
pass, Roach executed an aileron roll and then left for Denver.
2 16
As a result of this incident, the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") ordered Roach's license suspended for 60 days.2 1 7 Roach
sought review of this order with the FAA's regional office. At a de novo
hearing, the ALJ ruled that the FAA Administrator failed to prove that
Roach had violated any Federal Aviation Regulations because he failed
to prove that Roach flew within 500 feet of any building when he made
209. See supra note 204.
210. United States ex rel. Santana v. Fenton, 570 F. Supp. 752, 759 (D.N.J. 1981), rev'd.
on other grounds, 685 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115 (1983).
211. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980).
212. Id. at 248.
213. See Roach v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986).
214. 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986).
215. Id. at 1150.
216. Id. at 1149 (An aileron roll is an acrobatic manuever accomplished by rolling a
plane to one side in a complete somersault.).
217. Id. at 1150.
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his three passes over the runway.218 However, the ALJ upheld the re-
maining charges concerning the aileron roll, finding that the sales repre-
sentative was not a crew member who was performing crew member
duties, and he was not wearing a parachute, which violated FAA regula-
tions. 2 19 Accordingly, the ALJ reduced the suspension from 60 days to
30 days, a sentence which was subsequently affirmed by the NTSB.
2 20
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The key issue before the court was whether Roach's fifth amend-
ment rights were violated when the Administrator was allowed to call
him as an adverse witness. 22 1 Essentially, the court was faced with de-
termining exactly which rights under the fifth amendment would sup-
port Roach's argument. The answer to this problem centered on
whether the protections normally afforded a defendant in a criminal
proceeding extend to an administrative hearing as well. The court held
that if the suspension was intended as punishment, then it was criminal
in character, and the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by
the fifth amendment would apply.
2 22
The character of the sanction was to be determined by the Congres-
sional intent behind the statute. 22 3 After a lengthy analysis, the court
found the Congressional intent behind the enactment of the legislation
to be regulatory rather than punitive, and that the "clear proof" neces-
sary to override that intent did not exist. 22 4 Roach's trial was thus regu-
latory in nature, and not within the scope of the "self-incrimination"
clause of the fifth amendment.
2 2 5
Roach further claimed that the ALJ's interpretation of the applica-
ble FAA rules was unprecedented, and as such, violative of his due pro-
cess rights.2 26 While agreeing that parties have a right to be "informed
with reasonable certainty and explicitness of the standards by which a
license may be revoked," 22 7 the court ruled that the ALJ's findings had
followed long-standing NTSB interpretations, and that no violation of
due process had occurred.
22 8
Roach also claimed that the ALJ had created a novel definition of
"crew member" by interpreting the term to include only the persons





222. Id. at 1152.
223. Id. at 1153.
224. Id. (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365
(1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916 (1980)) ("only
the clearest proof... will override Congress' manifest preference for a civil sanction").
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1155.
227. Id. at 1155 (quoting Sorenson v. Nalional Transp. Safety Bd., 684 F.2d 683, 686 (10th
Cir. 1982)).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1156.
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Again, the court found this argument unpersuasive. The court found
that the ALJ's interpretation of the word "crew member" 23 0 was consis-
tent with the FAA's long-standing position on the issue. The court thus
found that Roach had fair warning of the scope of the regulation, and its




In affirming the decision of the agency on all counts, the court was
particularly concerned with the self-incrimination aspect of Roach's fifth
amendment argument. Although the court had often dealt with the
question of self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, it had little expe-
rience in applying the fifth amendment in administrative hearings. 2 3 2
The court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms23 3 for the test which would trigger the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment. The Firearms court had stated that for a
party in an administrative hearing to be able to assert a defendant's fifth
amendment right not to take the stand, it must be decided whether the
sanctions contemplated by the hearing are regulatory or punitive in
nature.234
The Tenth Circuit then relied upon the standard for the regula-
tory/punitive distinction as set forth in United States v. Ward.23 5 The
Ward court stated that the "inquiry in this regard traditionally proceeds
on two levels. The first step inquires as to Congress' intent in establish-
ing the penalizing mechanism. The second step inquires as to whether
the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect so as to
negate that intention.
'23 6
The Tenth Circuit concentrated its analysis on the list of considera-
tions set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.2 3 7 That court stated those
considerations as follows:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has been historically regarded as punish-
230. Id. The FAA does not provide a definition for "crew member." However, the
court felt that the student pilot exemption contained in 14 C.F.R. § 91.15(d) (1987) should
have placed Roach on notice that mere assistance during the flight would not elevate his
passenger to crew member status. The court thus held that the parachute requirements of
14 C.F.R. § 91.15(c)(1987) were reasonably applied to the facts.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1981); Enrichi v. United
States, 212 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1954).
233. 465 U.S. 354 (1984). The Court held that gun owner's acquittal on criminal
charges involving firearms does not preclude a subsequent in rem forfeiture proceeding
against the same firearms. Neither collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil
proceeding initiated following an acquittal on criminal charges.
234. Id. at 362. If the sanctions contemplated are punitive in nature, then the absolute
self-incrimination protections of the fifth amendment may be invoked. If the sanctions are
regulatory in nature, then the fifth amendment's protections do not apply.
235. See supra note 208.
236. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1153.
237. 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (where the Court held that deprivation of citizenship was
penal in nature and that draft evaders were entitled to fifth amendment protection).
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ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned .... 238
However, the Tenth Circuit also placed this "test" within the confines of
a "showing of only the clearest proof."
2 3 9
The court found that this clear proof did not exist, and hence, Con-
gress' apparent intent that the sanction be regulatory rather than puni-
tive could not be overcome by a theory of overriding effect or
purpose. 240 This ruling was consistent with other courts' holdings in
other cases. 24 1 In those cases, the courts generally found that when an
act includes a penalty within a civil section, and discusses criminal penal-
ties in an entirely separate section, a strong indication is made that Con-
gress intended the penalty to be civil. 2 42 The case at bar was precisely
of this type; the act in question discussed criminal penalties in a separate
section which expressly excluded violations of safety regulations from its
purview.
24 3
The ruling was also consistent with that line of cases 24 4 in which
courts have found that license suspension or revocation proceedings are
not criminal for the purposes of determining the admissibility of previ-
ously immunized, compelled testimony. 2 45 The court acknowledged a
contrary line of cases, 246 fostered by Judge Prettyman's dissent in Lee v.
Civil Aeronautics Board,24 7 in which the Civil Aeronautics Board held that
a suspension of an airman's certificate was penal in nature. 248 However,
the Tenth Circuit ruled that the more recent judicial trend was toward
the former rationale. 24 9 The court thus held that since the suspension
did not have a clearly penal purpose or effect, no fifth amendment rights
were violated.
238. Id. at 168-69.
239. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1153. The Kennedy factors are analyzed in the overall frame-
work of the lWard "clearest proof" test.
240. Id. at 1153-54.
241. Id. at 1153.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (The court relied on such cases as In Re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 476-77 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied sub. nom Daley v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Burley v. United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, 443 F.Supp. 619, 622-23 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
245. Id. at 1154 n.7.
246. Lewis H. Brubaker and Charles E. Olsen, 19 C.A.B. 885, 886-87 (1954); Herbert
R. Galloway, INTSB 2104, 2105 (1972); Pike v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 303 F.2d 353, 357
(8th Cir. 1962).
247. 225 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Judge Prettyman's dissent maintained that
suspension of pilots' certificates was punitive in nature, and therefore the pilots were enti-
tled to fifth amendment protection.
248. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154 n.7.
249. Id. at 1154.
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4. Conclusion
The Roach decision appears to be a soundly reached decision, and is
a step forward in clarifying the line which divides regulatory and penal
administrative hearings. In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit had
many additional factors weighing in favor of its ruling. For example,
Roach's flight certification was a privilege voluntarily granted, thus its
revocation was "characteristically free of the punitive criminal ele-
ment."' 2 50 However, it is also significant to note that Roach's privilege
was also the means by which he earned his living. The argument could
have been advanced that he was being deprived of a vested property
right, which may have triggered a more independent standard of
review.
25 '
The court also had public interest on its side. As the NTSB found,
there was a substantial public interest in the safety of air commerce and
air transportation which Roach violated with his low passes and acro-
batic rolls. 2 5 2 Lastly, the equities of the case pointed toward an affirm-
ance of the agency/ALJ ruling. The penalty which Roach received was a
thirty-day suspension of his pilot certificate, 2 53 a penalty which could
hardly have shocked the conscience of the court. It was thus not difficult
for the court to defer to the agency's decision.
The Roach case was an excellent opportunity for the court to clarify
a somewhat muddled situation among the circuits concerning the scope
of fifth amendment protections in agency proceedings.2 54 The court
took advantage of this opportunity to provide a framework in which the
nature of agency proceedings may be analyzed. 2 55 Only time will reveal
the impact this case will have on the uniformity of such decisions in
other circuits.
CONCLUSION
If there were hopes that the "doctrine" of judicial restraint in the
review of agency decisions would become a more settled area of law,
they were quickly frustrated by the recent survey period. The cases were
factually complex, yet among those facts, one struggles to find the keys
to what triggers judicial restraint and what does not.
Particularly difficult to reconcile are the United Transportation and
250. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
251. See Halaco Eng'g Co. v. South Cent. Coast Regional Comm'n, 720 P.2d 15, 227
Cal. Rptr. 667, 42 Cal. 3d 52 (1986) (where developer claimed he had vested right to
continue his development, it was proper for court to apply independent standard of
review).
252. Roach, 804 F.2d at 1154.
253. Id. at 1150. The ALJ had dropped one of the four charges against Roach, because
the Administration had failed to prove that Roach had flown within 500 feet of a building
in violation of Federal Aviation Regulation 91.57. In view of Roach's long history in avia-
tion, the ALJ reduced the original 60 day suspension to 30 days.
254. See 804 F.2d 1147 and cases cited therein.
255. It should be noted that the court was able to decide the issue while deferring to
the ALJ's decision-which no doubt made their own decision easier to attain.
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Commercial Office Products cases. In the former, the Tenth Circuit inter-
preted a statutory term based on congressional intent, the plain lan-
guage of the regulation, and the agency's prior interpretations. 2 56 In
doing so, the court refused to defer to the agency interpretation. In the
latter case, the court determined that congressional intent and agency
interpretation were outweighed by the plain language of the regula-
tion.2 57 The court also refused to defer to agency interpretation. It is a
troublesome pattern, with common elements being considered, but with
almost irreconcilable results being reached. Between the two cases, the
only common denominator it seems, is the court's refusal to defer to
"agency expertise."
Fortunately, the Rutherford case sheds some light. Despite its
pretensions of dealing with jurisdictional limits, one cannot overlook the
fact that the case dealt with the scientific issue of what constitutes a new
drug. 258 The court was very uneasy about allowing a lower court to
wander too far into an unknown realm. 2 59 In contrast, the court seems
much more confident about its ability to decide issues that deal with
statutory interpretation, e.g., the United Transportation Union and Commer-
cial Office Products cases.
In the attempt to reconcile these cases, no true test emerges. What
does emerge however, is the somewhat amorphous rule that the limits
on judicial pre-emption of an agency ruling are drawn at the point where
the court no longer feels more qualified than the agency to adjudicate
the issue.
ADDENDUM
On May 16, 1988, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Commerical Office Products Company.26 0 In so doing, the Court concen-
trated on two questions. The primary question considered was whether
a state agency's decision to waive its exclusive sixty-day period for initial
processing of a discrimination charge, pursuant to a work sharing agree-
ment with the EEOC, "terminates" the agency's proceedings within the
meaning of section 706(c) of Title VII, so that the EEOC immediately
may deem the charge filed.
The Tenth Circuit had reasoned that a state agency "terminates" its
proceedings only when it completely surrenders its jurisdiction over a
charge. 26 1 Since the Colorado Civil Rights Division ("CCRD") had re-
served jurisdictional right to review the EEOC's decision in this case, the
256. United Tramp., 797 F.2d at 829.
257. Commercial Office Prods., 803 F.2d at 588-89.
258. Rutherford, 806 F.2d at 1461.
259. Id.
260. 108 S.Ct. 1666 (1988). Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor filed an opinion in which she concurred in part and with the judgement. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia
joined. Justice Kennedy did not participate.
261. 803 F.2d at 587.
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Tenth Circuit held that the CCRD did not "finally and unequivocally
terminate its authority."'2 62 The Tenth Circuit had expressly rejected
the First Circuit's interpretation of the same filing provisions in Issac v.
Howard University.2 6 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the conflict.
I. THE DECISION
The majority opinion concentrated on the definition of the term
"terminated" as contemplated by the statute. The Tenth Circuit had
held, in the face of the EEOC's conficting interpretation, that "termi-
nates" meant "completely relinquish[ing] its authority to act on the
charge at that point or in the future."' 264 The Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation and adopted the First Circuit's view that "terminates"
includes "cessation in time.''265 This interpretation supported the
EEOC's position that a state agency "terminates" its proceedings when
it declares that it will not proceed for a specified interval of time.
The basis of the Supreme Court's decision was a finding by the
Court that the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language in the en-
abling statute was entitled to judicial deference. The Court found that
the EEOC's interpretation was more than amply supported by the legis-
lative history of the deferral provisions of Title VII, the purposes of
those provisions, and the language of other sections of the Act. 26 6 The
secondary issue considered by the Court was Commerical Office Prod-
ucts' argument that the extended 300-day federal filing period is inappli-
cable to this case because the complainant failed to file her
discrimination charge with the CCRD within Colorado's 180-day limita-
tions period. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, affirming the
decisions of the various circuits which had ruled on the question. 26 7
The Court reasoned that the imposition of state limitation periods upon
section 706(e) would confuse lay complainants and contradict the reme-
dial scheme of Title VII in which lay persons, not lawyers, are expected
to initiate the process.
2 68
The Court further reasoned that such consideration of state limita-
tion periods would unnecessarily involve issues of state law.2 69 The
Court was not willing to force the EEOC to decide such issues as
whether state limitation periods are waived or equitably tolled. The
Court thus affirmed its ruling in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,2 70 in which the
Court held that a complainant "need only file his charge within 240 days
262. Id. at 590.
263. 769 F.2d 817 (1st Cir. 1985).
264. 803 F.2d at 589 n.13.
265. 108 S.Ct. at 1676.
266. 108 S.Ct. at 1671.
267. See Gilardi v. Schroeder, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987); Mennor v. Fort Hood
Nat'l Bank, 829 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1987); Maurya v. Peabody Coal Co., 823 F.2d 933 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. at 1030 (1988).
268. 108 S.Ct. at 1676.
269. Id.
270. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
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of the alleged discriminatory employment practice in order to ensure
that his federal rights will be preserved." 2 7 1 The Court found that such
a holding "establishes a rule that is both easily understood by complain-
ants and easily administered by the EEOC."
27 2
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
majority's opinion that the agency's construction was reasonable and
therefore entitled to deference. 2 7 3 However, she was careful to point
out that the majority's strong language in rejecting the respondant's po-
sition, 274 should not be interpreted as a statement by the Court that an
agency decision to adopt the respondant's position would be rejected by
the Court. 2 75 This concurrence took a strictly deferential approach,
based solely on the "traditional deference accorded the EEOC in the
interpretation of the statute."
2 7 6
The dissent simply took the position that the Court's decision "is
not faithful to the plain language of the statute, the legislative compro-
mise that made it possible to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or to




The Supreme Court's decision is a reaffirmation of the doctrine of
judicial deference to agency interpretation of statutes. The Tenth Cir-
cuit had refused to accept the EEOC's construction of its own enabling
statute, even though the interpretation appeared to be reasonable. The
Supreme Court's decision reaffirms the circuit court's obligation to de-
fer to agency interpretation when that interpretation appears reason-
able. If the circuit courts had begun to exceed the boundaries ofjudicial
pre-emption of agency decisions, the Supreme Court's holding re-estab-
lishes those parameters.
On a more practical level, the decision benefits those for whom Ti-
tle VII was designed to benefit, lay claimants who are the victims of dis-
crimination. It removes the filing procedures for such claims from the
dockets of the courts and returns them to the local agencies and lay
claimants where they may be dealt with in a more efficient manner. By
clarifying the law on this matter, the Court may have gone a long way
toward relieving the antagonism which had manifested itself between
the Tenth Circuit and the EEOC in this case.
Greg Jaeger
271. Id. at 814.
272. 108 S.Ct. at 1676.
273. Id.
274. The majority had labelled the respondant's position "absurd." Id. at 1674.
275. 108 S.Ct. at 1676 (concurring opinion).
276. Id. at 1677.
277. 108 S.Ct. at 1677 (dissenting opinion).
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